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Traditional explanations for indirect trade through an entrepot have focused on savings in transport
costs and on the role of specialized agents in processing and distribution. We provide an alternative
perspective based on the possibility that entrepots may facilitate tariff evasion. Using data on direct
exports to mainland China and indirect exports via Hong Kong SAR, we find that the indirect export
rate rises with the Chinese tariff rate, even though there is no legal tax advantage to sending goods
via Hong Kong SAR. We undertake a number of extensions to rule out plausible alternative hypotheses





















Indirect trade through an entrepôt is a common phenomenon in world commerce. For 
example, for every $100 that the United States exports to mainland China, approximately $23 goes 
through Hong Kong SAR. Globally, indirect trade as a share of the total trade is estimated to be 
around 17 percent (Andriamananjara, Arce, and Ferrantino, 2004). There are thirty-some countries 
that are involved in a significant amount of indirect trade. Macao, Cyprus, Fiji, Senegal, Jordan, 
Armenia, Seychelles, Honduras, Benin, Montserrat, St. Lucia, and Singapore are some of the other 
prominent entrepôts through which indirect trade takes place.  
Explanations in the literature for this high volume of indirect trade have focused on the 
presence of specialized agents that match buyers and sellers across markets (Feenstra and Hanson, 
2004) and the economization of transport costs, which has a similar rationale to the hub-and-spoke 
pattern in airline traffic (Andriamananjara, Arce, and Ferrantino, 2004).  These factors are 
undoubtedly responsible at least in part for the high rates of indirect trade. However, we propose 
an alternative, previously undocumented explanation in this paper: the use of entrepôt economies 
to facilitate tariff evasion.  As in the traditional argument for indirect trade, the evasion-based 
explanation also posits a role for specialized agents that are better positioned to transport goods to 
their final destinations: In our explanation, the agents’ advantage is in transporting goods without 
paying the required tariffs. We suspect that the evasion-motivated indirect trade is likely to be 
particularly important for exports to countries with high tariffs and weak public governance.   
This explanation has been made casually in the policy arena; most recently, the UNCTAD 
Trade and Development Report (2005) speculates that tariff evasion may be responsible for the 
rise in entrepôt trade.  Further, there are also anecdotal accounts of this role of trade intermediaries.  
For example, a report from the United States Department of Agriculture, describes the “unofficial 
channels” that are used to export food products to China: “Using unofficial channels, to bring in a 
40 foot container of imported fresh fruit from Hong Kong to one of the cities in the Pearl River 
Delta costs approximately $4,000 to $6,000…This amount is usually much less than the price paid 
when using official channels.” (USDA, 1997).  However, there exists no systematic evidence on 
the use of entrepôt trade for tariff evasion purposes. 
We provide a quantitative examination of this hypothesis in the context of the Hong Kong 
SAR, the world’s largest entrepôt economy, where trade was 259 percent of GDP in 1998   3
(Feenstra and Hanson, 2004), and a common stopping point for goods both entering and leaving 
from mainland China.  Since Hong Kong is legally a separate customs area, China applied exactly 
the same tariff schedule on imports from Hong Kong as those from any other economy in the 
world during our sample period. In other words, there is no legal tax advantage of sending goods to 
China via Hong Kong.
1 
Over the last ten years, Chinese tariff rates have been declining steadily, from an average 
rate of 23.6 percent in 1996 to 15.8 percent by 2001. During the same period, the average fraction 
of the rest of the world’s exports to China that goes through Hong Kong SAR has also been on the 
decline, from 26 percent in 1996 to 20 percent in 2001 (see Table 1 for details). These aggregated 
statistics are consistent with the tariff evasion explanation for the indirect trade, though many other 
explanations are also consistent with this aggregate picture.  
This paper builds a case for the evasion hypothesis using disaggregated data on indirect 
exports to China via Hong Kong SAR. Tariff evasion, by its very nature, is not directly observable.  
We are thus required to take an indirect approach in testing any hypothesis related to evasion.  The 
methodology we use in this paper is straightforward.  On a product by product basis, we compute 
indirect trade intensity – the ratio of indirect exports to China going through Hong Kong SAR to 
total exports to China – and examine if it has any systematic relationship with product-level tariff 
rates. The benefit of indirect trade for the purposes of evading tariffs is increasing in the value of 
tariffs evaded, and hence the tariff rate
2.  As there is no preferential tariff treatment for indirect 
trade via Hong Kong SAR (or elsewhere), this forms the basis for our test of our ‘outsourcing 
evasion’ hypothesis.  With disaggregated data (at HS 6-digit level) for the years 1996-2001, we 
find a clear positive association between tariff rate and intensity of indirect trade. This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that part of the role of the middlemen is to help evade tariff payments.   
The use of indirect trade may be correlated with a good’s need to be intermediated (for 
example, products  with lower demand elasticities may be more likely to be transshipped). This is 
problematic if the latter is correlated with the tariff structure, leading to a spurious correlation 
between indirect trade intensity and tariff level. We therefore extend the analysis by adding 6-digit 
HS fixed effects and also by differencing the data.  This effectively deals with any characteristics 
                                                 
1 Since January 1, 2004 (outside our sample), China has reduced tariff rates to zero on many direct imports from Hong 
Kong. MFN rates continue to apply to indirect imports from other countries passing through Hong Kong. 
2 If we assume that the potential punishment does not increase linearly (see, for example, Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002), 
we expect the rate of transshipping (relative to direct shipment) to be increasing in the tariff rate – there is a greater 
incentive to evade tariffs on high tariff goods.   4
of imports that are not time-varying.  We find that the results remain statistically significant at the 
one percent level, though the point estimates are somewhat reduced.  
We provide several additional robustness tests of our results.  First, we look at sectors for 
which most importers receive legal tariff exemptions.  Since there is little evasion-related 
motivation reason to undertake indirect trade in such industries, we do not expect to observe any 
correlation between tariffs and indirect export intensity; this is borne out by the data, as we do not 
find any tariff-indirect trade correlation for this set of products in our data.  
We provide two additional tests that specifically address alternative explanations based on 
the two traditional rationales for indirect trade.  To examine whether specialized knowledge may 
be responsible for our results, we examine trade in homogeneous and differentiated products 
separately based on the Rauch (1999) classification. This is based on the idea that there may be 
economic rationales, unrelated to evasion, for trade in differentiated products to go through an 
entrepôt , as a middleman’s specialized knowledge on a differentiated product could help to 
mediate the trade. Indeed, Feenstra and Hanson (2004) suggest that Hong Kong may play an 
important intermediary role for differentiated products, since such products may require greater 
quality sorting. In contrast, there may be less specialized product-specific knowledge involved for 
trade in homogenous products. We find a positive correlation between tariff rate and indirect trade 
intensity for both homogenous and differentiated products. This further bolsters our interpretation 
that tariff evasion is a significant motivation for the observed indirect trade. Second, to assess the 
credibility of explanations based on transport costs, we include a control for total trade volume (a 
loose proxy for shipment size). This also does not affect our basic results. 
We provide an illustrative calculation to get a sense of quantitative importance of evasion-
induced indirect trade. According to one specification that we present below, a ten percent increase 
in tariff rate would lead to an increase in the indirect trade rate by 2.9 percentage points. Thus, an 
increase in the tariff rate from zero to 19 percent (the average statutory tariff rate in China in 2001) 
would lead to an indirect export rate of about 5.5 percent, suggesting that about a quarter of the 
indirect exports through Hong Kong may be accounted for by evasion motivations. 
It is important to note that the paper does not call into question the integrity of the Hong 
Kong customs nor the reliability of Hong Kong statistics. In fact, the paper relies on the accuracy 
of the Hong Kong customs’ statistics to make the analysis meaningful.   5
In addition to bringing new insight to the literature on indirect trade, we also contribute to 
the growing empirical literature on tax evasion and smuggling.  Relevant theoretic work and earlier 
empirical research are discussed in Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2000). A recent paper by Fisman and 
Wei (2004) provided an estimate of the responsiveness of tax evasion at the Chinese borders to 
Chinese tariff rates. The current paper differs from Fisman and Wei (2004) in several important 
ways. Fist, while the earlier paper addresses a public finance question- the elasticity of evasion to 
tax rates, the current paper investigates a trade question – whether the prevalent entrepôt trade 
phenomenon in the world commerce could be explained by tariff evasion. Second, the earlier paper 
does not automatically imply the result in this paper: It is logically possible that entrepôt trade is 
unrelated to evasion even if there is evasion at the Chinese border. The earlier paper, however, is a 
necessary condition: the Chinese border has to be corruptible for Hong Kong to serve as an 
intermediate step to evade tariffs. 
  The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a conceptual framework.  
Section 3 describes the datasets brought together for this research. Section 4 presents our 
estimation strategy and results. Section 5 concludes. 
  
2.  Empirical Framework 
 
  For expositional purposes, we assume in this section that tariffs may only be evaded by 
routing goods through Hong Kong and that traders are risk-neutral. For simplicity, we assume 
every trader exports a fixed amount, V. We describe the cost-benefit trade-off associated with 
evasion for a typical trader k in industry i as being given by: 
 
Benefitik = τiV 
Costik = C + γ τiV + ηik 
 
 Here,  τi is the tariff rate for industry i. The cost includes a fixed, a variable and a random 
component: C is the fixed cost; γ < 1 describes the variable cost; ηik represents the random 
component, which is realized before the trade makes the decision.  A representative trader (of good 
i) would choose to evade if and only if the benefit of doing so exceeds the cost, or 
   6
 ηik ≤ (1-γ) τiV - C 
 
 Assuming  that  ηik is i.i.d. across all traders and has a cumulative distribution function F, 
then the fraction of exports in industry i that may be re-routed to Hong Kong to evade tariffs is 
given by: 
 
(1) (Indirect Export Rate)i = F( (1-γ) τiV - C )  
 
  If we further assume that F has a uniform distribution, we may express this as a linear 
regression: 
 
(2) (Indirect Export Rate)i = α + β*τi + εi, where β > 0 
 
Intuitively, if it is relatively inexpensive to evade tariffs by using Hong Kong as an entrepôt, a 
larger fraction of trade will be routed through Hong Kong if the tariff rate is higher.
3 
  If the random cost, ηik, does not follow a uniform distribution, or if the cost of evasion is 
non-linear in the tariff rate, then the indirect trade rate may be a non-linear function of the tariff 
rate. 
 
3.  Data 
 
Three pieces of data are crucial for our empirical tests: (a) Chinese tariffs, (b) direct exports 
to China at a product level, and (c) indirect exports to China via Hong Kong at a product level.
4 
The data on Chinese tariffs are taken from the World Bank's World Integrated Trade 
Solution (WITS) database, derived from the UNCTAD TRAINS (Trade Analysis and Information 
System) database, which gives tariff rates at the 8-digit HS level.  Since our import/export data are 
                                                 
3 This paper has not formally examined the issue of possible endogeneity of the tariff rate. If the government were to 
set the tariff rates with revenue maximization in mind, it may set relatively high rates on products that are somehow 
physically more difficult to evade tariff, then the true effect of tariff on indirect trade would be even bigger than 
documented here. 
4 It is these data requirements that preclude the expansion of our analyses to a broader set of countries.  First, the 
UNCTAD TRAINS database described below has significant gaps for many countries.  Second, we require data on re-
exports as reported by the entrepôt country itself, since data on re-exports generally do not list the intermediate 
country.   7
at the 6-digit level, we need to aggregate tariff rates up to the 6-digit level.  As there is relatively 
little variation in tax rates at the 8-digit level within a 6-digit category, we are able to restrict 
ourselves to the sample for which there are uniform rates at this level of aggregation. 
The earliest year for which we have detailed data on tariffs is 1996, and our data reflect 
year-end tariff rates.  Since the import and export data are cumulated for the entire year, matching 
imports with the appropriate tax rates is complicated by mid-year changes in the tariff structure.   
There were no tariff changes in 1996.  In 1997, tariffs were changed on October 1st for this year, 
we take a weighted average of year-end 1996 and 1997 tariffs as our measure of the 1997 tariff 
rate.  Since the tariff changes of 1998-2001 were all implemented on January 1, the tariff rate is 
uniform throughout those years.  We define Tariffit as the tariff rate on incoming goods in industry 
i in year t. 
  To calculate our indirect export rate, we require countries’ own reports of direct exports to 
China, as well as Hong Kong’s reports of indirect exports.  The direct export data come from 
WITS, which in turn gets its export statistics from the United Nations' Comtrade database.  These 
data are collected by the United Nations Statistical Division from individual countries' trade 
records, and include information on imports and exports for each country, recorded according to 
the 6-digit Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS).  For most of our 
regressions, we focus on countries where export data are available for the entire period, and further 
omit Africa and the Middle East because of very low export rates.  This yields a final set of the 29 
countries listed in appendix Table A1.  We define Direct_exportsict as the value in US dollars of 
direct exports in industry i from country c to China in year t. 
  Our indirect export data come from Smartal Solutions, the official provider of Hong Kong 
export statistics.  These data provide Hong Kong’s reported indirect exports to China, by country 
of origin, at the 6-digit HS level for 1996-2001.  Since tariff rates vary only at the industry-year 
level, we generate an aggregate indirect export rate, derived by summing up exports over all 
countries for a given industry-year:
5 
 
Indirect_export_rateit =  
 
                                                 
5 This is to avoid complications associated with clustering of standard errors across two types of groups, as suggested 
by Bertrand, et al (2004).  We obtain virtually identical results if the regressions are done at the exporter-year-product 
level of aggregation. 
   Σ(Indirect_exportsict+ Direct_Exportsict) 
 Σ Indirect_exportsict  c 
c   8
 
where Indirect_exportsict are indirect exports from country c in industry i and year t. 
Our robustness checks will require several additional datasets; for clarity of presentation, 
we will describe these additional data items when we discuss these tests. 
  In the first two columns of Table 1 we list the Hong Kong indirect export rates and tariff 
rates, by year, for 1996-2001.  Note that there is a high rate of indirect exports on average: 22 
percent for the full sample.  The average tariff rate, while 18 percent for the full sample, declined 
throughout the sample period, from approximately 23 percent in 1996 to 15 percent in 2001.   
In Figure 1A we show the basic relationship between tariffs and indirect export rates for 
1998, where the indirect export rate shown is the average for each integer tariff rate, conditional on 
having at least 10 observations per tariff rate.  The correlation is 0.53, and the graph shows this 
positive correlation.  In Figure 1B, we show the relation between the change in tariff rate during 
1996-2001 and the change in indirect export rate over the same period.  We see a similar pattern in 
this differenced relation – industries with the largest tariff declines also experienced the largest 
drops in indirect export rate.  We now turn to the results section to examine these relations in a 
regression framework. 
 
4.  Results 
 
Benchmark Estimate 
Our basic specification is based on equation (2) above, with a year fixed effect, δt,  included: 
 
(3) Indirect_export_rateit = α + β*Tariffit + δt + εit 
 
The results for specification (3) appear in Table 2.  In column (1) we present the basic 
specification (with year fixed effects, but no industry fixed effects), and find a point estimate on 
Tariff of approximately 0.25.  In specification (2), we add industry-year fixed effects, with the 
industry defined at the 3-digit HS level.
6 The slope estimate is now 0.29. This implies that a one 
percentage point increase in the tariff rate leads to a 0.29 percentage point increase in the indirect 
export rate. We regard this as our benchmark estimate. 
                                                 
6 Similar results are obtained with 2- or 4-digit HS level industry-year fixed effects.   9
  In terms of the economic significance of this effect, an increase in the tariff rate from zero 
to 19 percent (the mean tariff rate in the entire sample as reported in Table 1) leads to an increase 
in the indirect export rate by 19*0.29 = 5.5 percent, all else equal. The average indirect export rate 
in our sample is 0.23 (Table 1).  Evasion-motivated entrepôt trade thus explains almost a quarter of 
total indirect trade. 
 
Six-digit fixed effects and long differencing 
As a robustness check, we also define an industry fixed effect at the 6-digit level (the most 
disaggregated level for this data set), a total of approximately 3600 fixed effects. This absorbs all 
between product variation in tariffs, so that any relation between tariffs and indirect export rates is 
being identified entirely from within-good variation in tariffs.  Further, given the fact that tariffs 
were sometimes changed mid-year, generating identification from the year-to-year correlation 
between tariffs and indirect export rates may add a lot of noise.  The result is reported in Column 3 
of Table 2. The point estimate on tariffs declines to 0.11, but is still significant at the one percent 
level.. 
Finally, in column (4), we consider a differenced version of specification (2), given by: 
 
(4) (Indirect_export_ratei2001 – Indirect_export_ratei1996) = α + β*(Tariffi2001 –  Tariffi1996) + δt + εit 
 
We emphasize that, relative to the fixed-effects approach, this long-differenced approach is less 
likely to be affected by noise resulting from the timing of tariffs and sluggish responses to tariff 
changes, while still absorbing all between industry variation.  The point estimate is 0.17, and is 
statistically significantly different zero at the one percent level. 
 
Non-linear effects 
  As noted in Section 2 above, either a non-linear cost of evasion or a non-uniform 
distribution of firms’ costs of evasion will generate a non-linear relationship between tax rates and 
the extent of indirect trade through Hong Kong.  In Table 2, column (5) we include a quadratic 
term, Tariff 
2, that allows for a non-linear relationship between tariffs and indirect trade.  We find   10
that Tariff 





  Unfortunately, because of noise the fit of the regressions may be considered poor. A 
common method of dealing with noisy data is aggregation. We follow this approach, using as the 
outcome variable the mean value of the indirect trade rate for each tax rate. There are 53 distinct 
tax rates, thereby yielding a total of 53 observations per year. The result is reported in column (1) 
of Table 3, which shows that the positive relationship between tariff level and indirect export rate 
remains, with an increase in the adjusted R
2 to 0.26. In column (2), we report regression results 
where observations are weighted by the number of observations per tax bracket. As a final 
robustness check, in columns (3) and (4), we use the median (rather than mean) indirect export rate 
for each tariff rate as the dependent variable.  These additional regressions generate results that are 
very similar to those reported in column 1 of Table 3.  
 
Omitted product characteristics 
  One possible concern with the above results is that there may be a correlation between the 
goods for which middlemen have a comparative advantage in legal intermediation and the Chinese 
government’s choice of tariff structure.  It is not immediately clear whether this would lead to an 
overestimate or underestimate of the effect – traditional explanations of optimal tax setting focus 
on demand elasticities, and it is not obvious that goods routed through Hong Kong would 
necessarily be low demand elasticity goods.  Further, one might consider demand elasticities as 
part of the product fixed effects. Our results above are robust to the inclusion of 6-digit fixed 
effects and to differencing, which implies that the results may be identified from time variation in 
tariff rates; this allows us to effectively net out any product characteristics that are not time-
varying.   
                                                 
7 We obtain qualitatively very similar results using a spline regression by quartiles. Aside from a non-linear cost 
function of evasion, and a non-uniform distribution of the evasion cost across firms, our finding can also be explained 
by the possibility that at the higher end of the tariff schedule, a greater fraction of tariff evasion may take the form of 
outright smuggling, which is not recorded in our data. This could generate the pattern that legally recorded indirect 
trade as a share of total trade does not rise as fast as the tariff rate at very high tariff rates. We thank Martin Feldstein 
for suggesting this possibility.   11
We present a number of additional robustness checks below that try to further rule out the 
primary alternative explanations. 
 
Legal exemptions of tariffs 
  We consider the fraction of goods that enter China with tariff exemptions.  One explanation 
for the observed relationship between tariffs and indirect export rates that does not involve any 
illicit behavior is that it is easier to obtain tariff exemptions by routing goods through Hong Kong, 
and the incentive to obtain exemptions is increasing in the tariff rate.  This would then be a case of 
using Hong Kong middlemen to acquire legal tariff avoidance rather than illegal tariff evasion. 
However, if this were the case, then we would expect to see very little effect of the tariff rate on 
the indirect export rate for industries where very few exemptions are allowed.  We use imports 
broken down by exemption classification taken from Chinese Customs Statistics 1998 (Economic 
Information Agency, 2001).
8  These data are at the 8-digit HS level, which we aggregate to the 6-
digit level; we then calculate a measure of exemption intensity given by the ratio of the value of 
imports that enter China tariff-free to the total value of imports for each 6-digit category 
(Exemption).   
In the first column of Table 4 we report a specification that includes the interaction of 
Exemption and Tariff. The coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant at the 5 
percent level, implying a lower sensitivity of indirect trade to tariff rates for high exemption 
industries.  
As an alternative, we examine a subset of the sample with relatively few legal exemptions 
and another subset with a lot of legal exemptions. Specifically, regressions in columns (2) and (3) 
correspond to the sample of products below the 10
th percentile of exemption ratio (less than 16%) 
and above the 90
th percentile (greater than or equal to 99.6%) respectively.
9  It is clear from these 
results that industries with low exemption rates are driving our results: Tariff is positive and highly 
significant for the sample of products below the 10
th percentile of exemption ratio, while the 




                                                 
8 Unfortunately, due to the very high cost of obtaining these data, we have purchased only a single year of data. 
9 We obtain very similar results using the 5
th and 95
th percentiles as cutoffs.    12
Differentiated versus homogeneous products 
  Finally, we run tests that try to directly address specific alternative explanations based on 
the two traditional rationales for entrepôt trade.  First, as a test of the imperfect information/ 
quality sorting explanation, we examine whether there is a differential correlation between tariffs 
and indirect trade rates for differentiated versus non-differentiated products, as classified by Rauch 
(1999).  Feenstra and Hanson (2004) suggest that Hong Kong may play an important intermediary 
role for differentiated products, since such products may require quality sorting.  This may be of 
concern if differentiated products have higher tariff rates.  Note that our fixed effects and 
differenced models deal with this to a large extent, since product differentiation is not time-
varying. To bolster our case, we further examine whether the basic cross-sectional correlation 
differs according to whether the incoming good is differentiated.   
Rauch’s classification is at the 4-digit SITC level, which we match based on the 
concordance in Feenstra (1996);
10 we also cluster at the 4-digit SITC level to account for the 
coarser industry classification.  In Table 5 we present results with the sample split by Rauch’s 
classification. It turns out that the positive correlation holds for both differentiated and non-
differentiated products
11.  The point estimate of the slope is somewhat smaller for the homogenous 
products, consistent with the view that some of the indirect trade for differentiated products are not 
related to tariff evasion. However, if we pool the sample and include an interaction between tariff 
rates and a dummy variable for differentiated products, this interaction term is not significant. 
 
Adding trade volume   
Our results are unlikely explained by a motivation to save on transport costs. To see this, 
we note that such an explanation would require a number of steps.  First, shipment size, and hence 
the benefits from transshipment, is positively correlated with the indirect trade ratio.  Second, in 
order to account for the results that we report, there must be correlation between tariff rates and 
shipment size.  One possible channel is that larger shipments are correlated with higher overall 
rates of trade, which in turn may be correlated with tariffs due to political economy considerations.  
This explanation strikes us as requiring a big stretch of imagination.  Still, to try to control for this 
possibility, we include the fraction of the total value of trade in year y accounted for by industry i 
                                                 
10 The concordance is available at http://data.econ.ucdavis.edu/international/usixd/wp5515d.html.  
11 The sample is smaller because the classifications for some products are ambiguous and therefore excluded.   13
(FRACTION) in column 4 of Table 5.  Trade volume is indeed correlated with the indirect trade 
ratio: the coefficient FRACTION is significant at the one percent level.  However, the coefficient 
on tariff rates is completely unchanged; this is not surprising, since trade volume is uncorrelated 




  This paper documents that tariff evasion is an important motivation for the widely observed 
phenomenon of indirect trade in world commerce by studying indirect exports to China via Hong 
Kong. To build a case for this interpretation, the paper computes a measure of indirect trade 
intensity product by product (at the HS 6-digit level) – the ratio of indirect trade to total trade – and 
examines whether it is systematically related to product-level tariff rates. We find clear evidence of 
a positive, statistically significant relationship, both in levels and differences. 
  A number of robustness checks and extensions of the basic analysis help to further bolster 
our interpretation. For example, were it not for tariff evasion, specialized knowledge by 
middlemen should be much less valuable for homogenous than for differentiated products. Yet we 
find a similar positive correlation between indirect trade and tariff rates for the two groups of 
products. Also, for the subset of products for which tariff exemptions are widely granted (and 
therefore illegal tariff evasion at the border is less profitable), there is no correlation between tariff 
and indirect trade intensity.  
  Our paper makes both conceptual and methodological contributions. We highlight the 
possibility that the desire to circumvent high barriers to cross-border commerce can generate a role 
for middlemen in international trade. Our approach could be applied to a variety of other contexts.  
While data on direct trade and tariffs are available for many countries, good-quality data on 
disaggregated indirect trade are hard to come by. Replicating the specification in this paper for 
other countries when relevant data become available is interesting extension for future work. This 
would allow for an evaluation of whether the evasion-motivated indirect trade that we document 
here is particularly prevalent in high-tariff, weak-governance economies. In addition, it may 
ultimately be possible to evaluate, for example, the extent to which different source countries are 
prone to tariff evasion, by comparing how the relationship between tariffs and indirect trade varies 
across exporting countries.  We leave these topics for future research.    14
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Table 1 - Indirect Export Rates and Tariff Rates 
by year, 1996-2001 
Year 
Hong Kong  
Indirect export Rate  Chinese Tariff Rate 
1996 0.260  0.236 
 (4502)  (4502) 
1997 0.229  0.221 
 (4537)  (4537) 
1998 0.239  0.175 
 (4585)  (4585) 
1999 0.225  0.171 
 (4624)  (4624) 
2000 0.218  0.169 
 (4658)  (4658) 
2001 0.202  0.158 
 (4671)  (4671) 
Total 0.229  0.188 
   (27577)  (27577) 
Notes: The values listed are for the sample of 29 exporting countries listed 
in Table A1.  Numbers of observations are listed in the parentheses. For 
further details on the construction of the indirect export ratio, please see 
the text. 
 
Table 2 - Effect of Tariff Rate on Hong Kong Indirect Export Rate 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Tariff 0.250***  0.286***  0.113***   0.705*** 
 (0.027)  (0.044)  (0.040)    (0.100) 
ΔTariff      0.169***   
       (0.047)   
Tariff
2        -0.616*** 
         (0.134) 
Fixed Effects  Year  Year-Industry  Year & Industry  None  Year-Industry 
      (3-digit HS)   (6-digit HS)     (3-digit HS) 
Observations 27577  27577  27577  4411  27577 
R-squared 0.02  0.17  0.71  0.00  0.17 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, with clustering at the 6-digit HS level.  Dependent 
variable in specifications (1) - (3) is Indirect_export_rate.  In specification (4) the dependent 
variable is the five year difference in Indirect_export_rate.  For further details, please see the 
text.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
   16











Tariff 0.262***  0.267***  0.265***  0.291*** 
   (0.050)  (0.044)  (0.079)  (0.059) 
Observations 313  313  313  313 
R-squared 0.26  0.29  0.17  0.20 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, with clustering by tariff rate.  All regressions in clued 
year fixed effects.  Dependent variable in specifications (1) and (2) is the average value by year and 
tariff rate of Indirect_export_rate; in specifications (3) and (4) the dependent variable is the median 
value by year and tariff rate of Indirect_export_rate.  Regressions (1) and (3) are unweighted, while 
regressions (2) and (4) are weighted by the number of observations per tariff rate.  For further details, 
please see the text.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 4 - Tariff-exempted versus Non-exempted Industries 




   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Tariff 0.428***  0.440***  -0.174 
 (0.076)  (0.147)  (0.220) 
Exemption Rate  0.105***     
 (0.019)     
Exemption Rate  -0.224**     
     *Tariff  (0.094)     
Observations 25297  2526  2526 
R-squared 0.17  0.38 0.36 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, with clustering at the 6-
digit HS level.  All regressions include industry-year fixed effects, at the 
3-digit HS level.  Dependent variable in all specifications 
Indirect_export_rate.  For further details, please see the text.  * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5 - Differentiated vs. Undifferentiated Products; Trade Volume 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (3) 
Tariff 0.173**  0.280***  0.182***  0.289*** 
 (0.084)  (0.096)  (0.064)  (0.044) 
Differentiated     0.087   
   *Tariff      (0.073)   
Fraction of         14.00*** 
total  trade      (3.62) 
Sample Undifferentiated    Differentiated All  Products  All 
Products 
Fixed Effects  Year-Industry (3-digit HS) 
Observations 6375  12605  18980  27577 
R-squared 0.21  0.19 0.18  0.17 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, with clustering at the 4-digit HS level.  
Dependent variable in all specifications Re-export_ratio.  For further details, please see the 
text.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A1 - List of countries 





























United States  3,569   19
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